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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
RIGHTS OF PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS IN EXCESS
OF PREFERENCE
By JONATHAN H. ROWELL*
T HE compilers of American encyclopedias dismiss all questions
relating to the distribution of profits in excess of preferences,
as between preferred and common shareholders, by saying that,
where no contract is found, preferred shareholders may partici-
pate equally with the common in a fund remaining for distribution
after common stockholders have received a dividend equal in
amount to that paid in priority to the preferred.'
For this they cite some cases.2 The writer, however, while
finding cases opposed to the encyclopedias, finds himself unable to
agree either with the encyclopedias or with any of the American
cases standing with them or against them.
The rights of a stockholder are contractual,8 and where clear
provisions are found in the statutes, charter, by-laws, subscription
contract, certificate of stock, or elsewhere, such contracts are of
course controlling. However, as it will appear below, 4 the courts
may in some cases override what appears to be an iron-clad clause,
where supposedly conflicting rights appear. Accordingly, it will
be necessary to investigate the rights of the parties as determined
by law, in the absence of express agreements.
It should be noted, too, that as the rights of stockholders are
contractual we may not regard a certificate of stock as a single
commodity bought and sold on the market. The certificate may
carry voting rights; it may entitle the holder to a pro rata share
in the profits earned and declared in dividends; and it may repre-
sent an aliquot share in the assets of the corporation. It may
carry all these rights, or some of them, or none of them. As stock
may be "preferred" in ways limited in number only by the ingenu-
ity of business men and their lawyers, fruitful discussion of the
rights of holders of this stock must therefore deal with the prob-
*Of the San Francisco, California, Bar.
114 C. J. sec. 575; 7 R. C. L. sec. 263.
2Infra notes 6, 9.
3Spear v. Rockland-Rockport Lime Co., (1915) 113 Me. 285, 93 Al.
754; 1 Cook, Corporations, 8th ed., sec. 269.
4Infra, pp. 8-15.
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lems separately, in relation to the effect of action taken by the
corporation on each one of these rights.
As to the first problem-rights to cash dividends-no further
distinction need be made other than restricting the question to
stock preferred at least as to dividends, the express contract of
which does not preclude a right to dividends in excess of the pref-
erence. Stock dividends are, however, a far more complicated
matter. These must be dealt with by considering them more par-
ticularly in connection with stock preferred only as to dividends,'
to stock preferred both as to dividends and assets, and to stock
preferred in one or both of these ways but deprived of voting
rights.
I. CAsM DIVIDENDS
In the absence of express contract, preferred shareholders have
no right to participate in the distribution of cash dividends beyond
the antaunt of their preference.
With this proposition we take our first leave of American
precedents. The only discovered cases dealing squarely with the
problem are three Pennsylvania cases directly opposed to the sug-
gested view.
The most recent of these decisions, Englander v. Osborne,0 will
serve to present the argument in favor of the preferred shareholder.
In this case the defendant corporation, in which the plaintiff held
six per cent. cumulative preferred stock, had paid no dividends
on any of its stock for nine years. At the end of this lean period
it proposed to pay a dividend of fifty-four per cent. to both com-
mon and preferred stockholders. The plaintiff filed his bill to
restrain the payment of more than six per cent. to the common,
unless the preferred were allowed to share equally with the com-
mon stockholders in the amounts available for distribution in excess
of fifty-four per cent. to preferred and six per cent. to common
shareholders.
His position was sustained. The court argued that stock was
stock, and anything called stock which merely had an extra "frill"
still retained all rights not expressly taken away by the contract."
5 What Mr. Dewing calls the "simple unadorned preferred stock . . .
stock without any attendant frill. The preference consists merely of the
promise on the part of the corporation to pay the preferred shareholder
dividends before the payment of dividends to the common shareholder."
Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations 43.
6(1918) 261 Pa. St. 366, 104 At. 614, discussed in (1918) 3 M.N.1rso'A
LAw RBEwv 65.7The words of the contract were: "The holders of the preferred stock
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Among these rights inherent in the nature of stock is the right to
participate equally with other shareholders in the distribution of
profits.8 "The priority of the preferred stockholders rests upon
the contract, and beyond the provisions of such contract they
occupy no position toward the company different from that of
the holders of common stock. . . . Both classes of stockholders
are entitled to share equally in the excess."9
The opposite position is taken by the English case of Will v.
United Lankat Plantation Co.,' in which Farwell, L. J., states his
view with engaging charm:
"I do not follow the very ingenious argument of counsel for the
respondent in this respect. They treat the shares as though they
were born like babies into the world, all equal; and the preference
was a sort of rank which was an accidental attachment to such
of them as happen to be members of the House of Lords; but,
with great respect, the birth of the preference share limits in its
very inception the whole of its attributes.""'
The argument of the English court fully agrees with that of
the Pennsylvania cases in so far as they hold the rights of the
preferred stockholder to be contractual and to be exactly those of
an ordinary stockholder unless limited by contract. The reasoning
diverges, however, when the English court admits the existence
of an implied contract in addition to the express contract.1 2 The
court argues: (a) it is reasonable to believe that one who is receiv-
ing a preference as to dividends is thereby promising in return
to give up all right to dividends in excess of his preference; (b) it
is generally so regarded by business men.13
shall be entitled to receive when and as declared and the company shall be
bound to pay a fixed yearly cumulative dividend of six per cent, payable
quarterly, before any dividend shall be set apart on the common stock."
sSee 14 C. J. sec. 817 and cases cited.9(1918) 261 Pa. St. 366, 369, 104 Atd. 614. The case cites and follows
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., (1906) 215 Pa. St. 610,
64 At. 829; Sternbergh v. Brock, (1909) 225 Pa. St. 279, 74 Atl. 166;
Sterling v. Watson, (1913) 241 Pa. St. 105, 88 Atl. 297.
10(1912) 107 L. T. R. 360; [1912] 2 Ch. Div. 571, 81 L. J. Ch. 718,
aff'd [1914] A. C. 11, 83 L. J. Ch. 195.
"Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co., Ltd., (1912) 107 L. T. R. 360.
362. It is worth a note to mention that the reference to the House of Lords
as an "accidental attachment" is omitted from the Law Report's version of
Lord Justice Farwell's views.
2The express contract in Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co., Ltd.,
(1912) 107 L. T. R. 360, read: ". . . the holders thereof to be entitled to
cumulative preferential dividends at the rate of ten per cent per annum . ..
and that such preference shares rank, both as regards capital and dividend, in
priority to the other shares."
13The court relied on a statement in Palmer's Company Precedents, 11th
ed., p. 814, to the effect that "It is generally assumed that where preference
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One argument against this position may be dismissed with a
word. It is stated in a recent law review artide as follows:
"Suppose that, for the sake of discussion, we admit that this
assumption is true . . . that the ordinary buyer does buy preferred
stock under the belief that he will be limited to the amount of
the preference. It does not follow that it is true that his right to
receive dividends above the amount of the preference was lost
merely because most men in his position would think it lost.""'
It is, of course, true that rights, once required, cannot be lost
by thinking them so, but it is submitted that the question is whether
a right is ever acquired when the contracting parties understood
their words as negativing such a right.
The same writer offers another argument against the view here
taken. Other rights inherent in the nature of "stock" are not
lost, he points out, by the according of a preference as to
dividends.
"... In the absence of some provision to the contrary in the
contract .... all shareholders are owners of equal rights, in pro-
portion to the number of shares held by each shareholder." . . .
All are equally entitled to vote in stockholders' meetings.18 The
owner of each share is entitled to one aliquot part of assets remain-
ing upon dissolution."' 7
From these analogies it is concluded that the right to partici-
pate equally in surplus earnings is not taken from the preferred
shareholder "in the absence of some provision to the contrary."
Assuredly, but it is again submitted that the question is whether
or not there is a provision to the contrary, express or implied.
Surely it is far-fetched to argue an implied promise to relinquish
voting rights or rights to an aliquot share of assets on dissolution,
in return for a promise of preferred dividends. Such trades are
manifestly unreasonable and are understood by no one to be the
consequence of receiving a preferred dividend right. Trading a
right to a pro rata share in all earnings in return for a prior right
shares are given a fixed preferential dividend at a specified rate that impliedly
negatives any right to take any further dividend, and probably this assump-
tion is well founded.'
"4Jay Finley Christ, Right of Holders of Preferred Stock to Participate
in the Distribution of Profits, (1929) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 731.
"5Citing Ryder v. Alton and S. R. Co., (1851) 13 Ill. 516; State v. Balti-
more & 0. R. Co., (1847) 6 Gill. (Md.) 363.
16.Citing Mackintosh v. Flint & P. M. R. Co., (C.C. Mich. 1887) 32 Fed.
350, (C.C. Mich. 1888) 34 Fed. 582.
17Citing Jones v. Concord & Hf. R., (1892) 67 N. H. 119, 30 Atl. 614;
Lloyd v. Penna., etc., Co., (1909) 75 N. J. Eq. 263, 72 Atl. 16.
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to a specified ratio of earnings is, however, reasonable and often
done.
The choice, then, between these two views will be determined
solely by whether an implied agreement to forego a chance for
speculative gain is construed to result from the acceptance of an
express priority in the payment of a specified dividend.18 What
other courts will do is anybody's gamble. 19
The following discussion will, where necessary, deal with the
problems involved from the standpoint of both positions taken
with respect to the payment of cash dividends. For brevity, the
view favoring the preferred shareholder will be called the "Penn-
sylvania rule," and that denying the holder of preferred shares
further rights beyond his preference will be called the "English
rule."
II. STOCK DIVIDENDS
In the absence of express contract, the rule as to stock dividends
is the same as the rule as to cash dividends.
This proposition is stated separately as more extended argu-
ment will be necessary to support it, although the rule is followed
by every discovered case except one. The writer is unable to
agree with any of these cases, and will find it necessary to supple-
ment the rule with subsidiary corollaries needed to protect impor-
tant rights of stockholders. A review and criticism of two repre-
sentative cases will serve to present the problem.
1 1t should be pointed out, too, that the circumstances of the issue, tile
objects of the agreement, whether the preference stock was issued in the
normal course of business or as a "trade" for bonds during a reorganization,
and so forth, may determine the decision as to the existence of an implied
contract. See 1 Cook, Corporations, 8th ed., sec. 269; Scott v. Baltimore &
0. R. Co., (1901) 93 Md. 475, 49 AtI. 327.
19As indicating that the Maryland court would favor the English court's
view, see Scott v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1901) 93 Md. 475, 49 Atl. 327, in
which a certificate providing that "the holders of preferred stock . . . are
entitled to receive in each year . . . such yearly dividend as the board of
directors may declare, up to, but not exceeding, four per centum, before any
dividends shall be set apart or paid upon the common stock" was held to be
an express contract limiting the preferred to four per cent and no more. It
seems clear that the words "not exceeding" could have been construed, had
the court wished, as applying to the percentage preferred in time (i.e., before
any amount was paid on the common) rather than to the amount payable to
the preferred at any time. See also James F. Powers Foundry Co. v.
Miller, (Md. 1934) 171 AtI., 842.
See George J. Thompson, Respective Rights of Preferred and Common
Stockholders in Surplus Profits, (1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 463, agreeing with
the English view.
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The first of these is Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co. 20 In that
case the defendant corporation, having a capitalization of 4000
shares of cumulative preferred stock receiving annual dividends
of eight per cent. and preferred also "as to capital," and 3000
shares of common stock, authorized the issue of 3000 shares of
common pursuant to a vote passed at a special stockholders' meet-
ing. Plaintiff, non-consenting owner of 100 shares of preferred,
brought suit to be allowed to participate in this dividend.
He lost. The court argued substantially as has been done above
in support of the "English rule" and reasoned that as "the com-
mon stockholders bear substantially all the losses of adversity"
they should be "entitled to the gains of prosperity." 2'
It was apparently not seen by the court that it was awarding
to the common stockholders not only the "gains of prosperity"
of the past but the power to direct the achievement of that pros-
perity in the future. As the preferred stock carried voting rights,
the 4000 shares of preferred stock could, prior to the distribution
of this dividend, have controlled the company. The dividend
changed the position of the preferred from that of carrying the
whip hand in the ratio of four to three to that of minority stand-
ing in the ratio of two to three.
This point was evidently not raised in the case. The dissenting
judge does not mention it, relying solely on the argument for the
"Pennsylvania rule" outlined above.
In Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Branch,22 however,
the preferred shareholder was better advised. He sued the cor-
poration in assumpsit for damages sustained by him because of its
refusal to divide with the preferred stockholders a stock dividend
of twenty-five per cent. issued to the common, arguing that both
his voting rights and his rights to share in the assets were impaired
by the issue of the stock dividend.
20(D.C. N.Y. 1912) 196 Fed. 994, aff'd (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1913) 202 Fed.
141, cert. denied (1913) 231 U. S. 748, 34 Sup. Ct. 320, 58 L Ed. 465.
2 1(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1913) 202 Fed. 143. The Niles case is followed in
Stone v. U. S. Envelope Co., (1920) 119 Me. 394, 111 Atl. 536, where the
preferred shareholders were denied the right to subscribe to an issue of
common stock on the same terms as the common shareholders. As the stock
was offered at a price below its value, the common stockholders argued it
was, in effect, a dividend, and that preferred shareholders had no right to
subscribe. This contention was upheld. See also Hatch v. Newark Telephone
Co., (1930) 34 Ohio App. 361, 170 N. E. 371, in accord with the Niles Case.
Cf. Tenant v. Epstein, (Ill. 1934) 189 N. E. 564, discussed in (1935) 19 MiN-
NEsoTA LAw R~vmrw 239.22(1927) 147 Va. 509, 137 S. E. 620.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In spite of an express provision in the certificate limiting the
preferred stock to a six per cent. dividend and no more, 23 tile
plaintiff was awarded damages amounting to the market value of
the shares the court held should have been issued to him.
This decision appears even more startling than that in the
Niles Case. A preferred stockholder may not have a cash dividend
in excess of his preference, but he may be awarded cash damages
to the amount of the value of stock he should have been given-
ascertained on a basis of the market value of that stock, and entirely
aside from whatever value there may have been in the lost voting
and capital share rights-all this on a plea that his voting and
capital share rights have been impaired!
There appear to be at least three possible grounds for the
result of this case, each of which it will be well to examine. The
most obvious basis is that pointed out in criticism of the Niles
Case above. The preferred shareholders had voting and capital
rights which would be impaired by denying them a right to stock
dividends. The language of the court indicates that this is the
main ground for the decision.
"'... A distribution of shares of stock . . . as a stock dividend
to common stockholders alone, when the preferred stockholders
are preferred as to dividends only, seriously affects the interest
of the preferred stockholder in the corporation, affecting his voting
influence and diminishing his interest in the assets of the corpora-
tion. . . . The issuance of a stock dividend to the common stock-
holders to the exclusion of the preferred stockholders, is an iji-
pairment of the rights of the latter which entitles them to relief
in equity if the stock has not been delivered, or to damages for
breach of a contract obligation if it has."214
This is the interpretation put upon the case by Mr. Christ,
author of the law review article referred to above,2 5 and supported
as the correct view. That writer's conclusion, in brief, is that pre-
ferred stock should be entitled to participate in stock dividends,
even in the face of an express limitation of rights to dividends,
whenever a denial of such participation "will disturb the equi-
librium of voting power" or wherever necessary "to protect its
rights on dissolution.1
2
23". .. Said stock shall not entitle the holder thereof to receive out of the
profits of the Company, any greater or other dividend than said six per cent
annually."
24(1927) 147 Va. 509, 516-7, 137 S. E. 620, 622-23.25Christ, Right of Holders of Preferred Stock to Participate in the
Distribution of Profits, (1929) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 731.26Christ, Right of Holders of Preferred Stock to Participate in the
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It seems difficult to find support in the law of contracts for
such a view. Since the rights of a stockholder in these matters
are contractual, the terms of that contract must be ascertained as
of the time of its execution, and may not be varied thereafter. The
suggested position, however, will alter the contract in the oscillat-
ing light of ensuing events. Where the issue of the dividend would
shift the "equilibrium of voting power," the preferred shareholder
may have his dividend; where the dividend is of a lesser amount,
no right to it will be given to the preferred stockholder.
There are two ways out of this difficulty. One is to regard the
"equilibrium" disturbed as that between individual holders of
stock and hence come frankly to the result that any stock dividend,
however small, must be divided with the preferred shareholders.
The contract will then never vary, but will be construed as allow-
ing cash dividends exclusively to common stockholders but requir-
ing the division with preferred shareholders of stock dividends.
This "way out" will be examined later in connection with a second
possible ground for the Riverside Mills Case.2 T
The second way possible is that apparently taken by Mr. Christ.
He restricts the meaning of "disturb the equilibrium of voting
power" to a disturbance, not between some individual holder and
another, but to a transfer of controlling power from the preferred
stockholders as a group to the common stockholders as a group.28
This position is scarcely less difficult, for to get around the objec-
tion as to varying the terms of the contract in the light of later
events we must interpret the express provision that "the preferred
stock is entitled to a preferred dividend of N per cent. and no
more" as impliedly meaning, further, "except that when the paying
of a stock dividend to the common stock will shift the voting con-
trol of the corporation from the preferred shareholders as a class
to the common shareholders as a class, the preferred stock shall
be entitled to share pro rata with the common in this dividend."
Mr: Christ found himself unable to view with any favor the
implied contract supported by the English courts in cases involving
Distribution of Profits, (1929) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 731, 749, 750.27Infra, p. 414.28Christ, Right of Holders of Preferred Stock to Participate in the
Distribution of Profits, (1929) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 731, 745. "... . If the com-
mon shares are more numerous, its majority is increased [by a dividend
shared by both] ; if the preferred shares are more numerous, they must out-
number the common shares more than two-to-one [if the preferred is non-
voting] in order that the distribution of a 100 per cent stock dividend be
capable of shifting the control from the common to the preferred."
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cash dividends. Here the common stockholders are by express
contract entitled to the whole of any dividend paid beyond that
allotted in priority to the preference shares. Shall we say that they
have impliedly agreed to relinquish that right in the event the
distribution of a dividend to them will carry with it the added boon
of voting control of the corporation? The question seems to carry
its own answer.
A second ground to support the result of the Riverside Mills
Case was suggested above by noting the practical result of one
meaning of "disturb the equilibrium of voting power." That is
that an express contract denying a right to "dividends" in excess
of the preference does not extend to a denial of rights to a "stock
dividend." Some language of the court would seem to support
this interpretation.
"The object and purpose of the limitation was to prevent the
holders of preferred stock from receiving a dividend in excess
of six per cent. upon preferred stock, and not to preclude them from
becoming holders of common stock, or from receiving a dividend
on common stock which other holders of common stock might
receive.
'2
9
Under this view of the case the result would seem to be the
same if the preferred stock were preferred both as to dividends
and assets and deprived of voting rights. In such a case no im-
pairment of the rights of preferred shareholders would result
from the stock dividend, and the policy of protecting such rights
would not enter in.
The argument, in brief, is that something is said in the con-
tract about "dividends," but nothing is said about "stock divi
dends." Therefore, there being no express contract to alter the
original equality of all stock, every share, preferred and common
alike, may have stock dividends equally.3 0 The reasoning would
possibly be the same where no contract is expressly provided, if
we follow the "English rule," and that of the Niles Case, that
the preferred shareholder has no rights in the surplus even in
the absence of an express agreement. Is it valid? Or does the
express agreement as to "dividends" entail an agreement as to
29Language in Branch v. Riverside Mills, (1924) 139 Va. 291, 303, 123
S. E. 542, 545, infra, p. 415, quoted with approval in the principal case.30Mathematics applied to the facts of the case indicate that i startling
inequality may be the result of this quest for equality. The corporation's
capitalization was 60,000 shares of common and 75,000 shares of preferred.
15,000 dividend shares were issued to common stockholders, each of these
shares being valued by the jury at $200. Assuming all preferred stockholders
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"stock dividends?" And does the implied agreement as to "divi-
dends" extend to "stock dividends ?"
It seems to the writer that the only answer to both questions
is in the affirmative. Business men do not indulge in such re-
fined thinking. Stock dividends are not such uncommon occur-
rences as not to come within the average man's conception of
"dividend." 3' They should, therefore, be included in an agree-
ment, express or implied, to forego any rights to dividends in ex-
cess of an expressed preference.
A third ground of possible support for the Riverside Mills
Case is that in Virginia stockholders still have preemptive rights.82
The preferred stockholder has no right to a dividend, but when
tfiat dividend is in the form of stock, the issue of which will dilute
his interest in the corporation, the stockholder's preemptive right
may enter in and overbalance the denial of dividends beyond an
expressed preference.
There is also language in the decision to lend color to this
third suggested basis. The case purports to follow a previous
decision involving the same parties, which accorded the preferred
stockholders a right to subscribe to a new issue of common stock
on the same terms as those offered to common stockholders, 3 and
quotes with approval from that case:
should assert their rights, we may construct the following table on the value
in dollars to each class resulting from the transaction:
No. of Shares Dividend Value
Common 60,000 15,000 shares $3,000,000Preferred 75,000 Equiv. of 8,333 shares $1,666,666
Assuming, further, that damages paid by the corporation will be paid
by all stockholders ratably, we may subtract one-half of the damages from
the preferred value and one-half from the common (including the dividend
shares), leaving:
Class Value fromt Transaction
Common ............. $2,166,667
Preferred .................................... 8 33,333
Total .................................... $3,000,000
The net result is apparently that the common stockholders have been
forced to disgorge $833,333 of their dividends to the preferred. They have a
good deal left.31Mr. Dewing points out that stock dividends were issued as early as
1670 by the East India Company, and that the New York Central declared a
stock dividend in 1869. It is true, however, that such dividends did not
come into their present general use until after the World War. Dewing,
Financial Policy of Corporations, 566.32Branch v. Riverside & Dan River Mills, (1924) 139 Va. 291, 123 S. E.
542. Statutes in several states either abolish preemptive rights or allow the
corporation to abolish them by appropriate provisions in the charter. See
infra, p. 423, note 55.33Branch v. Riverside & Dan River Mills, (1924) 139 Va. 291, 123 S. E.
542.
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"It is clear that the preference does not deprive the preferred
stockholder of his preemptive right to subscribe to his pro rata
share of the new issue of stock." 34
Shortly following this quotation, the court avers that "the
principles upon which that case was decided ...are applicable to
the case at bar.""" The conclusion of the court that the same
principles cover both cases is, it is submitted, correct. But does
it follow that both cases were decided correctly? The burden of the
present discussion is to argue that they were not; that preferred
stockholders should not be given a preemptive right when giving
them that right will result in giving them a dividend to which they
are not by their contract entitled.38
This view, as applied to holders of stock preferred as to assets
and having no further rights in assets beyond the preference ("non-
participating" shares), is supported by Mr. Morawetz in an article
in the Harvard Law Review. He writes:
"To give to the non-participating shareholder a share dividend
or a right to take additional shares at a price below their actual
value would be, in effect, to give them an extra dividend out of
surplus to which they are not entitled, and this extra dividend
would be at the expense of the holders of the common and par
ticipating shares. . . . If non-participating shareholders have any
preemptive right in case of the issue of additional shares, it can
be only a right to take a proportionate part of the additional shares
upon payment of their actual value. . . . If shares can be bought
and sold freely in the market, their value is their market price.""?
The case of "participating" shareholders, who are preferred
only as to dividends and hence have equal rights with the common
in the assets on dissolution, Mr. Morawetz says is considerably
different. In their case the issue of new stock is a dilution of their
capital interests, and they must be protected. 8 The argument
may be best presented by an example.
A corporation has issued 1000 shares of stock preferred as
to dividends, but not as to assets, and 1000 shares of common,
both at $100 a share. Its total capital comes, then, to $200,000.
34(1924) 139 Va. 291, 303, 123 S. E. 542, 545.35Riverside Mills v. Branch, (1927) 147 Va. 509, 516, 517, 137 S. E.
620, 622.36Issuing stock to shareholders at less than its market value is equivalent
to declaring them a dividend in the amount less than the market value. Stone
v. ,U. S. Envelope Co., (1920) 119 Me. 394, 111 Atl. 536.
7Victor Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, (1928) 42
Harv. L. Rev. 186, 195.38Victor Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, (1928) 42
Harv. L. Rev. 186, 189-192.
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In time it collects a surplus of $100,000. At this stage the "book
value" of every share of stock, preferred and common, has risen
to $150 a share because of this surplus and the shareholders' equal
rights to it.s ° A stock dividend of 1000 common shares is de-
dared to common stockholders. As a result of this transaction the
number of shares has been raised to 3000, the capital to $300,000,
and the book value of each share is now $100. The common stock-
holders each have a total value of $200 where before they had only
$150. Clearly the preferred stockholders have been robbed of
$50 a share by the dividend.
But is it dear? One thing should be pointed out-that the
value of a right to participate in assets on dissolution, taken alone,
is much overrated.40  It does not in fact add to the market value
of a security appreciably unless the increased book value is re-
flected either in greater safety or in higher dividends. The pre-
ferred stock we are dealing with here is amply safe, with a large
surplus behind it. And the dividend stays the same, no matter
how high the book value may go. The market value cannot go up
as does that of common stock with an increase in book value. The
market value of safe preferred stock remains constant at a figure
set by capitalization of the annual dividend rate. This being so,
the preferred stockholder has merely been "robbed" of a value
he had not, and on which as a practical matter he may never
realize. For this loss we are going to compensate him by giving
him a valuable, salable right to which he would not otherwise be
entitled. It seems to the writer that this is too much of a good
thing.
In sum, it is the contention of this paper that the giving of a
share in a stock dividend is a "windfall" to the holder of prefer-
ence shares which goes far beyond what is necessary for the pro-
tection of his voting and capital interests. It may be granted that
these rights should be protected. It will be the purpose of the
balance of this paper to suggest how they may be protected with-
out over-protecting them to the detriment of the rights of com-
mon shareholders.
39Holders of shares preferred only as to dividends have equal rights with
the common in surplus earnings not declared in dividends. Continental Co.
v. United States, (1922) 259 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 540, 66 L. Ed. 871.
4OThe claims of creditors and costs of winding-up usually exhaust the
assets. Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations, 49, 50.
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III
The owner of stock preferred only as to dividends may enjoin
the issue of dividend stock to common shareholders on a show-
ing of injury to his power of control, or to his capital interest.
By stock preferred only as to dividends is meant a stock which
is in all other respects equal in rights with common stock. Holders
of such stock have voting rights and rights in the assets of the
corporation similar to those of common shareholders.
This being true, it follows that these interests must be pro-
tected by the directors in their management of the corporation
and that any discrimination against one class of shareholders in
favor of another would be a breach of the directors' fiduciary
duties."1 A preferred stockholder who can show that a proposed
stock dividend to common shares exclusively will damage either
his voting influence or his capital interests to an amotnt requiring
relief should be able to require the dividend to be declared in
non-voting stock if only the plaintiff's voting influence is being
threatened, or in cash, if injury to his capital interest is shown. 4 2
Two queries in all probability immediately come to mind at
the statement of this proposition.
(a) If the preferred stockholder is not injured enough by the
issue to grant him a preemptive right, how may we find injury
enough to ground a right to an injunction?
The answer to this is two-fold. In the first place, it was not
contended above that no preemptive right should be given the pre-
ferred stockholder, but only that a preemptive right at a price be-
low the actual value of the stock should not be given. Accordingly,
if the preferred is given, and satisfied with, a preemptive right to
buy his share of the dividend stock at its actual value, no injtuc-
tion against the issue of the dividend should be granted.
But, second, the preferred shareholder may not be satisfied
41"It is the duty of directors as fiduciary agents . . . to exercise a power
to issue additional shares, as well as all their other powers, in good faith for
the benefit of the shareholders who constitute the corporation. If there are
different classes of shares, this power must be exercised with impartial regard
for the rights and interests of the shareholders of each class .... It is a
breach of duty on the part of directors to issue additional shares or to sell
treasury shares, not to benefit the shareholders, but to benefit themselves, or
to enable particular shareholders or others to acquire voting control of the
corporation." Morawetz, (1928) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 186, 188. See also Borg v.
International Silver Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1925) 11 F. (2d) 147, 151-2.
42ff the plaintiff delays until after the stock is issued, he should be
awarded damages representing the value of the voting or capital rights lost.
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with such a preemptive right. And his dissatisfaction is well
founded if the injury he complains of is dilution of his capital
interest. Such an interest may not be given away, but must be
preserved regardless of the stockholder's financial ability to make
new purchases of stock.4 3  It is believed, therefore, that the issue
of stock for no fresh contribution to capital should be subject to
an injunction on the complaint of the preferred stockholder."4
(b) If the dividend could be declared in cash to the common
stockholders exclusively, why may not stock certificates repre-
senting that cash be so issued?
This argument points out that the right of the preferred to
participate in surplus on dissolution may always be given a barren
field on which to operate, by simply declaring that surplus out
in cash dividends before the wind-up or reorganization. Why
then, it may be asked, may the right not be diluted to nothing by
putting more shares in competition with it?
Aside from the fact that this reasoning completely ignores
practical considerations in the way of declaring a surplus all out
in dividends,45 it must be seen that the declaration of a stock
dividend is a direct invasion of the right, while a cash dividend
merely makes the right of no value. The right is to share pro
rata in surplus -assets, if any, without further competition with
shareholders who did not contribute their share of those assets by
paying full value for their stock. A cash dividend has no effect
on this right, although it may remove the fund on which the
right can operate. A stock dividend, on the other hand, emascu-
lates the right.
The Riverside Mills Case dealt with the type of stock con-
sidered here-that preferred only as to dividends. It is submitted,
43This would seem to follow from the fiduciary relation between share-
holder and director, where the preemptive right is limited, as the writer
contends it should be, to a right to buy only at actual value. Financial
inability to take up shares cannot be pleaded where the stock was offered to
stockholders at less than its value, as the rights could have been sold and
the value of the dilution of assets thus recovered. Upton v. So. Produce Co.,
(1926) 147 Va. 937, 133 S. E. 576.
44Common stockholders may enjoin the issue of common stock below its
actual value to holders of stock preferred as to dividends and assets, on the
ground that the interest of the common stockholders in surplus will be
diluted by the issue. Borg v. International Silver Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1924)
2 F. (2d) 910. A sale to the highest bidder is unobjectionable if bona fide.
Borg v. International Silver Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1925) 11 F. (2d) 147.
S5It furthermore ignores the possibility that a reorganization price may
be inflated by expectation of future earnings. See Hatch v. Newark Tele-
phone Co., (1930) 34 Ohio App. 361, 170 N. E. 371.
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in conclusion, that the case is correct as to its analysis of the
problems involved but mistaken in the solution found for them.
IV
The omner of stock preferred both as to dividends and assets
may, on a showing of injury to his power of control, enjoin the
issue of voting div4dend stock, or, in the alternative, demand a
right to share in the dividend by paying actual value.
By stock preferred both as to dividends and assets is meant
stock which still retains one right equally with the common-
the right to vote." A distribution of stock as a dividend exclu-
sively to common shareholders cannot be objected to by the holder
of such preferred stock on the ground that his capital interest is
being impaired. It is, rather, being strengthened, as what was
before surplus and capable of being distributed in cash has now
become capital, to add to the security of the preferred stock-
holder.
The preferred shareholder's voting rights can, however, be
injured by such a dividend. He should be given a right to enjoin
the issue of any but non-voting stock, or cash. The Niles Case7
dealt with stock of this type and refused relief to the preferred
stockholder. A case offering a solution more nearly that proposed
here is Russell v. American Gas and Electric Co.,4s in which a
holder of stock preferred both as to dividends and assets brought
a bill to enjoin the issue to common stockholders, at par of $50,
of common stock worth $80, unless preferred stockholders were
4cIn England, strangely enough, another right is retained. While the
English courts hold that the giving of a preference as to dividends impliedly
negatives any right to dividends in excess of the preference, they hold never-
theless that the giving of a preference as to assets does not preclude tle
preferred shareholder from sharing ratably in any surplus assets remaining
after the common shareholder has been paid the amount of his capital contri-
bution (paid up or promised). Re John Dry Steam Tugs, Ltd., [1932] 1 Ch.
594, 101 L. J. Ch. 271, 147 L. T. 493; Anglo-French Music Co., Ltd. v.
Nicoll, [1921] 1 Ch. 386, 90 L. J. Ch. 183; In re Fraser and Chalmers, Ltd.,[1919] 2 Ch. 114, 88 L. J. Ch. 343, 121 L. T. 232; In re Espuela Land and
Cattle Co., [1909] 2 Ch. 187, 78 L. J. Ch. 729, 101 L. T. 13. Decisions in the
United States are to the contrary. Murphy v. Richardson Dry Goods Co.,(1930) 326 Mo. 1, 31 S. W. (2d) 72; Hatch v. Newark Tel. Co., (1930)
34 Ohio App. 361, 170 N. E. 371; Williams v. Renshaw, (1927) 220 App.
Div. 39, 220 N. Y. S. 532. The rights of such a stockholder should be held
to be similar to those of holders of participating stock, if the English view is
taken-for the stock is participating after the common has been made equal.
7(D.C. N.Y. 1912) 196 Fed. 994, aff'd (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1913) 202 ed.
141, cert. denied (1913) 231 U. S. 748, 34 Sup. Ct. 320, 58 L. Ed. 465.
48(1912) 152 App. Div. 136, 136 N. Y. S. 602.
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given a chance to subscribe on the same terms. The plaintiff
based his bill on a plea that his "interest" in the corporation would
be decreased. As the only "interest" possible of dilution by the
issue was a voting interest, we may infer that the preferred stock
carried voting rights.
The bill was dismissed, subject to the condition that the plain-
tiff be given a right to subscribe to preferred stock, par $50, value
at $47, to preserve his "interest." The proviso was a sorry one
for the hopeful plaintiff to swallow, but the case at least shows
an attempt to search for a manner of protecting voting rights of
preferred stockholders without giving them a "windfall" divi-
dend.
The case illustrates, too, the other remedy besides an injunc-
tion for the holder of this class of stock-a preemptive right to
buy stock at its actual value. The right should apply as well to the
new stock as to other stock.4 9  Furthermore, the owner of such
stock must be satisfied with this remedy if it is offered, for the
preservation of voting control is subject always to the share-
holder's financial ability to keep his pro rata share in the enter-
prise. More than this, it must be admitted that in the case of stock
preferred as to assets as well as to dividends-and thus under the
American cases precluded from further sharing in the assetsl°-no
objection can be taken to the issue of stock directly to common
shareholders for no fresh contribution, provided a preemptive
right to buy at actual value is given. As the corporation might
have declared a cash dividend, and then credited that cash divi-
dend toward the purchase of new stock, it may do this in shorter
fashion by transferring that surplus to capital and issuing stock
representing the funds transferred to the common shareholders
for no new cash. The preferred stockholders had no right to
that surplus.51 They can merely insist on a right to subscribe to
the new stock on the same terms as it is issued to any one else,"
49See quotation from Morawetz, supra, p. 416.5OSee cases cited supra note 46.
51The same cannot be said of stock preferred only as to dividends. The
holders of such stock have equal rights to a surplus not declared in dividends
Continental Co. v. United States, (1922) 259 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 540,
66 L. Ed. 871.52The leading cases on preemptive rights are Gray v. Portland Bank,(1807) 3 Mass. 364 and Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., (1906) 186 N. Y.
385, 78 N. E. 1090. See also Jones v. Concord and M. R. R. Co., (1892)
67 N. H. 234, 30 Ati. 614; Wall v. Utah Copper Co., (1905) 70 N. J. Eq. 17,
62 Ati. 533; Bates v. United Shoe Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1913) 206 Fed. 716, afl'd(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1914) 216 Fed. 140.
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which in this case would mean paying in cash from their own
pockets an amount equal to that paid in cash by the common stock-
holders out of their "pocket" in the custody of the corporation.
This may be illustrated from the facts of the Niles Case. The
Ludlow Mfg. Co. had outstanding, it will be remembered, 4,000
shares of preferred stock and 3,000 shares of common stock-
both issued at pars of $100. The corporation had accumulated a
surplus of $500,000. Table I represents the capital set-up before
the stock dividend of 3,000 shares of common was declared.
TABLE I
Shares Total Value Value per Share
Pfd. - 4000 $400,000 $100
Com. - 3000 $300,000
$500,000 (surplus) $266.66
As the common stockholders are to pay no new value for their
shares, a little figuring indicates the proper issue price of the new
stock as $186.66. Table II shows the result of the issue, assuming
that a preemptive right is given the preferred shareholders at
$186.66 a share, and that all the stock is bought by the share-
holders.
TABLE II
Value per
Common Shares Total Value Share
Orig. Corn ......... 3000 $300,000 (orig. cap.)
Bought by pfd ... 1714.3 $320,000 (cash by Pfd.)
Bought by Com...1285.7 $239,988 (out of surplus by coin.)
Total Corn .......... 6000 $859,988 (new cap.) $186.66
$260,012 (remaining surplus)
$1,120,000
This table shows that the preferred shareholders have spent
$320,000 in order to retain their position in voting control-an
expense of $80.00 to each share of preferred. Common share-
holders have likewise spent $80.00 per share out of the surplus
fund. Each shareholder, preferred and common, has purchased
.429- of a share.
Under the actual facts of the Niles Case, however, the entire
issue of stock went to the common shareholders. The court reasoned
that, as a cash dividend could have been declared, no objection
could be made to the issue of stock certificates representing that
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cash.5 3 Utterly forgotten was the fact that each certificate also
represented a voting right, in addition to a share in the assets.
Had the corporation been a large one with shares easily ob-
tainable on the market, perhaps no objection can be found to the
result of the case. 54 In view of the difficulty of purchasing shares
in small corporations at their actual value, and of wholesale pur-
chase of shares in large corporations, it is submitted that the pre-
ferred shareholders in the Niles Case should have been given a
preemptive right, or, in the alternative, an injunction against the
issue of voting stock.
The remedy of injunction is rendered all the more necessary
at the present time, as new state legislation is tending either to
abolish preemptive rights or to allow the corporation to abolish
them by appropriate provisions in the charter. 55 Furthermore,
it is clear that the same objections to allowing preemptive rights in
general 56 do not militate against allowing them in these cases, or
against allowing an injunction. Corporations which properly issue
stock dividends are not under a financial pressure forcing them to
procure new capital speedily, without the bother of submitting
rights to shareholders in advance.5 7  Also it must be noticed that
5.... The question turns upon who owned the $00,000 accumulated
by the defendant prior to the time the stock dividend was declared. If the
common stockholders were entitled to have the amount distributed to them
as cash, they were dearly entitled to certificates of stock representing that
cash" (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1913) 202 Fed. 141, 142-3.54Although it can readily be seen what price the preferred shareholders
would have had to pay on the market, had they all desired to buy.55E.g., California Civil Code, sec. 297; California Statutes 1931, p.
1771. "Unless otherwise provided in the articles, the board of directors
may issue shares, option rights, or securities having conversion or option
rights, without first offering the same to shareholders of any class or
classes." See also Indiana, Burns' Ann. Stats. (Burns' 1929 Supp.) Sec.
4827 (i), and Illinois, Rev. Stats. (Cahill, 1933), Bus. Corp. Act, Ch. 32,
Sec. 24; Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minn. Laws 1933, eh. 300,
Sec. 31 (i), discussed in Hoshour, The Minnesota Business Corporation
Act, (1933) 17 MINNESOTA LAw REviEw 689, 698.56Practical considerations of marketing securities have led many to
regard the judge-made necessity of submitting issues to the procrastinating
option of shareholders as more trouble than the right is worth. See, e.g.,
Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev.
586. See also Berle and Means, Modern Corporation and Private Property,
146, 176-179, 258, 259.57
"The stock dividend should not be declared, even when the invested
profit and loss surplus is ample, if the credit position is not fundamentally
sound. The declaration of a stock dividend implies that the stockholder's
capital has been invested in the business, and that it would be unwise to
withdraw this capital. . . .The company should not, therefore, represent
that it has capital to divide in the form of a stock dividend, if it seeks to
secure at the same time more capital from outside sources." Dewing, Finan-
cial Policy of Corporations, 568.
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a corporation issuing stock dividends has seen fit to accord a
preemptive right of the surest kind to one class of its shareholders.
Equal treatment requires that the same rights be given to all
classes.
V
The owner of common stock, in a "Pennsylvania Rule" juris-
diction, nay enjoin the issue of voting stock as a dividend to
holders of preferred stock without voting rights.
Heretofore we have been solicitous of the rights of the preferred
stockholder. Now we come to a situation in which the common
stockholder has a grievance. The owner of stock preferred both
as to dividends and assets (and with no further participation
rights), but deprived of voting power, has no grounds for objec-
tion to a dividend declared to the common shareholders exclusively.
None of his rights will be touched.
The common stockholder, however, in a jurisdiction giving
such a preferred stockholder a right to stock dividends, is in a
position to object. His voting interest in the corporation is being
given away with the dividend to the preferred stockholder. Sup-
pose, for example, a corporation having 100 shares of preferred
and 100 shares of common, which shares sold for $100. The
corporation starts, then, with a capital of $20,000. Upon the
accumulation of a surplus of $10,000 it proposes to issue a divi-
dend of 100 shares of common stock pro rata to the preferred and
common shareholders. As a result of the dividend, one who owned
fifty shares of common stock and who thus had fifty per cent. of
the voting control would come out with seventy-five out of 200
shares of common stock-or 37.5 per cent. of the voting control.
It has been held in Pennsylvania that holders of preferred
stock having voting rights are entitled to a dividend of common
stock in excess of their expressed preference, after the common
shareholders have received a dividend equal to the preferred divi-
dend.5"
Mr. Christ, in the law review article referred to above,59 sug-
gests that if the preferred stock had not had voting rights it
should not be entitled to a stock dividend which would "shift the
equilibrium of control" from the common stockholders as a class
58Sterling v. Watson, (1913) 241 Pa. St. 105, 88 Atl. 297.59GChrist, Right of Holders of Preferred Stock to Participate in the
Distribution of Profits, (1929) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 731.
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to the preferred stockholders as a class. It is the position of this
paper that a more equitable solution, in view of the objections
taken here to Mr. Christ's argument, would be to give the coin-
mon shareholders a right to enjoin the issue of the dividend, un-
less the stock were made non-voting, or unless the dividend were
declared to the preferred shareholders in cash.
